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ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. V
DOBSON: HOW THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT WILL KEEP
CONSUMERS AND CORPORATIONS OUT
OF THE COURTROOM
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the United States Supreme
Court closed the door on state attempts to regulate arbitration agree-
ments by holding that Congress intended to exercise its commerce
power in full when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA" or
"the Act")' in 1925. 2 In so holding, the Court has eviscerated numerous
state statutes, including statutes designed to protect consumers, and
expanded the FAA to cover transactions for which it was never de-
signed. 5 The Court, however, has also ensured that the FAA will serve
effectively its intended purpose of providing businesses with a less
expensive, faster method of resolving their disputes.'
Since its enactment in 1925, the scope of the Federal Arbitration
Act has been in doubt. 5 A murky legislative history has spawned ques-
tions as to when the Act governs an arbitration agreement." Constitu-
tional concerns about applicability in state court proceedings as well
as statutory construction issues have complicated this determination.?
Seventy years after the FAA's enactment, the United States Supreme
Court finally settled these issues in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson. 8
This Note examines the decision and its probable impact on
commercial and consumer contracts." Part I provides a brief discussion
of arbitration and its advantages and disadvantages.'" Part II examines
the history of arbitration law in the United States and the enactment
of the FAA." Part III then reviews the series of decisions interpreting
1 0 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988 & Stipp. V. 1994),
2 115 S. Ct. 834, 838-39, 841 (1995).
3
 Id. at 843, 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See id. at 838, 840, 842-43.
' See, e.g., id. at 836; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I (1984); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
See Terrainix, 115 S. Ct. at 839.
7
 See id. at 838-39.
8 Id. at 839-40.
See infra sections V—VI reviewing and analyzing the decision and its impact.
I° See infra notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 33-77 and accompanying text.
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the scope of the FAA that provide the necessary background for Ter-
minix.' 2 Part IV reviews the majority concurring and dissenting opin-
ions in Terminix." Part V analyzes the Terminix decision." Finally, Part
VI examines the impact the Court's decision in Tel linix will have on
both commercial and consumer transactions.''
I. ARBITRATION AND ITS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Arbitration is a private mechanism for dispute resolution that uses
neutral third parties to review claims and make binding clecisions.' 6
Arbitration is generally seen as an alternative to litigation and is meant
to serve as a faster, less formal and less expensive way to resolve
controversies.' 7 Parties in arbitration may have attorneys or other rep-
resentation; they also may choose to represent themselves. 2 Often a
sponsoring organization, such as the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, appoints the arbitrator and the parties pay the arbitrator a per
diem fee.' 9 While processes differ, arbitration is often characterized by
limited discovery, hearings that do not follow formal rules of evidence,
and written awards that do not need to state the reasons or findings
that support the decisions.° Generally, arbitrators, unlike courts, are
not bound to follow the law and may consider a variety of factors when
making their decision.2 ' Judicial review of arbitration awards is very
circumscribed. 22 In general, courts will only review awards upon a
showing of actual misconduct by the arbitrator or a "manifest disregard
of the law.' 29 The arbitrator's overall goal is to determine a fair award
that comports with the parties' original agreement. 24
Arbitration tends to earn high marks for speed, fairness and cost-
effectiveness. 25 The business sector, in particular, has resorted to arbi-
12 See infra notes 78-158 and accompanying text
13 See infra notes 159-223 and accompanying text
14 See infra notes 224-36 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
16 G. Richard Shell, Res Judicala and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35
UCLA L. REV. 623, 628-29 (1988).
17 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425,429-30 (1988).
18 Id. at 433-54.
19 Shell, supra note 16, at 630-31.
2') Id. at 632; Stipanowich, supra note 17, at 438.
21 Shell, supra note 16, at 633.
22 Stipanowich, supra note 17, at 439.
22 1 MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 34:00, at 475-76 (Gabriel M.
Wilner ed., 1994).
24 Shell, supra note 16, at 633.
25 Stipanowich, supra note 17, at 457,460,461.
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tration to try to settle disputes more quickly and cheaply. 26 The use of
arbitration as administered by business organizations has helped to
develop uniform definitions of contract terms and conditions.° Arbi-
tration also can allow parties in ongoing relationships to avoid the
acrimony of litigation.'s Additionally, arbitration allows experts in par-
ticular markets or industries, rather than judges, to decide claims. 29
Arbitration does, however, have some disadvantages. Some re-
search has shown a tendency for arbitrators to "split the difference"
between the parties in order to preserve the parties' relationship, to
spawn repeat business from the parties or to enhance the arbitrator's
reputation as a moderate decision maker." Additionally, limited discov-
ery in arbitration can lead to "trial by surprise" which leads to longer
arbitration hearings and increased attorney preparation time for the
hearings.' This can both increase costs and lead to uninformed
awards."
II. AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT
Early American courts adopted a hostile stance towards arbitration
agreements from English courts." Courts and commentators conjec-
ture that the English courts developed a negative posture towards
arbitration because the agreements attempted to deprive them of ju-
risdiction and bypass the courts.'" This hostility translated into a refusal
to enforce arbitration agreements by considering them revocable until
an award was returned." American courts may have followed this rule
simply because it was well-settled, not because of its merits."
2("Doinke, supra note 23, § 2;01, at 13.
27 Id.
28
 Shell, supra note 16, at 629.
29 Id.
39 1d. at 633-34.
31 SOpaitowich, supra note 17, at 443-44, 452.
s2
 Id. at 444, 452.
" See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 838 (1995); see also Linda R.
Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. Ray.
1305, 1509-11 (1985); Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce
Requirement: What's Left for Stale Arbitration Law, 21 HOESTRA L. REV. 385, 389 (1992).
" Tertninix, 115 S. Ct. at 838; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n.5
(1955); Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in
the Federal Courts, 8 N.V.U. L.Q. Rcv. 238, 240 (1931); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton,
The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 282 (1926).
35 Strickland, supra note 33, at 389.
36 Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 211 n.5 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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In the 1920's, however, the business community began to pressure
legislatures to enact laws altering the common law rule." In 1920, New
York adopted the first statute that declared arbitration agreements
enforceable," Other states soon followed." Federal courts, however,
did not follow these statutes because they were seen primarily as pro-
cedural and because federal courts at that time were not bound by
state common law." Accordingly, in 1925, the United States Congress
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act. 41 Although the legislative history
is not entirely clear, it appears that the Act was intended simply to
complement state laws and make commercial arbitration agreements
enforceable in federal courts.42
The FAA's cardinal provision, section 2, provides that courts will
enforce written arbitration agreements in connection with either mari-
time transactions or contracts involving commerce whether entered
into before or after the dispute arises, unless grounds for revocation
of the agreement exist." The other sections of the act provide defini-
tions" and procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements." These
include methods of obtaining a stay of proceedings in United States
courts," a court order to compel arbitration, 47 the appointment of
arbitrators," subpoenas," and judicial enforcement," revision, 5 ' and
annulment of awards. 52 After passage of the Act, federal courts began
$ 7 liirshman, supra note 33, at 1311-12.
58 Id. at 1312.
59 Id. at 1312 & n.33; Strickland, supra note 33, at 389-90.
49 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 34 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Atlantic Fruit
Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5 F.2d 218, 219 (2d Cir. 1924).
41 Southland, 465 U.S. at 34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42 Southland, 465 U.S. at 12; id. at 34-35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
45 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The text of the statute states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.
Id.
44 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
459 U.S.C. §§ 3-10 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
46 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
47 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
45 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1988).
49 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
3°9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
31 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1988).
52 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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enforcing arbitration agreements. Thirteen years later, however, a
United States Supreme Court decision threatened the constitutionality
of the Act."
In the landmark 1938 decision, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," the
United States Supreme Court held that federal courts did not have the
power to fashion substantive common law and implied that Congress
could not do so in diversity cases." Erie involved the now famous story
of a Pennsylvania resident injured in his home state by a freight train
owned by the Erie Railroad Company, a New York corporation. 56 The
resident, Tompkins, sued the railroad in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. 57 Applying the federal common law of torts, the district
court found for the plaintiff despite Pennsylvania common law to the
contrary." In contrast, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that
the application of a general federal common law invaded the rights of
the states and encouraged forum-shopping by establishing the avail-
ability of different outcomes depending on whether parties filed the
case in state or federal court. 59 The Court, therefore, reversed the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which had
affirmed the district court's judgment." Thus, the Erie Court held that
there is no federal general common law and further stated that Con-
gress lacked the power to declare any such substantive rules of com-
mon law.6 '
After Erie, the FAA faced a number of challenges to its constitu-
tionality." Most of the cases involving arbitration agreements landed
in federal courts on the basis of diversity jurisdiction because disputes
over the agreements generally arose out of contracts." Contract inter-
pretation is mainly an area of state common law." It thus became
important to determine Congress's authority to enact the FAA.
The legislative history shed little light on whether Congress in-
tended the Act to replace general federal common law or whether
as See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
54
 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
63 Id. at 72, 78-79; Elirshman, supra note 33, at 1316.
66 Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
57 See id.
66 Id. at 70.
" Id. at 76,78-80.
6° Id. at 70,80.
61 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
62 Hirshman, supra note 33, at 1313-14; Strickland, supra note 33, at 392.
63 Lg., American Guar. Co. v. Caldwell, 72 F.2(1 209,210-11 (901 Cir. 1934).
64 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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Congress enacted the FAA under its Article III power to regulate
procedure in federal courts or under its Article I commerce and
admiralty powers. 65 If Congress meant the Act as a substantive federal
rule of decision, Erie suggested that Congress lacked the power to enact
it. 66 Moreover, between Erie and the 1965 United States Supreme Court
decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 67 it was uncertain whether federalism
concerns would render the FAA inapplicable in diversity cases if en-
acted as a procedural rule under Article 111. 68 As arbitration does tend
to lead to differing outcomes, the potential for forum shopping ex-
isted. 69 Parties to the agreement may have chosen between differing
federal and state rules regarding enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments depending on their assessments of the chances of a favorable
or unfavorable arbitration award." If Congress enacted the FAA under
its Article I powers, however, Erie would not invalidate the FAA because
Congress clearly had the power to enact substantive laws in the areas
of commerce:7 ' Although Congress usually provided for federal ques-
tion jurisdiction when enacting legislation under Article 1, it did not
do so in the FAA. 72 Moreover, the Act was not considered binding on
state proceedings," and the legislative history, although murky, indi-
cated that Congress saw arbitration and the FAA as procedural or
f5 Hirshman, supra note 33, at 1314-15.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
67 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In Hanna, the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitu-
tion gives Congress the power to regulate practice and procedure in federal courts, including
ambiguous issues that rationally could be considered either substantive or procedural. Id. at 472.
In Hanna, a defendant in a diversity case was served process in accordance with FED. R. Civ. P.
4. Id. at 461. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment because the service did not comply with a state law.
Id. at 461-62. The Supreme Court reasoned, in contrast, that Erie involved more than whether
the outcome differed under state or federal law; Erie also involved concerns With forum-shopping,
equal protection due to "substantial" differences between state and federal law, and federalism.
See id, at 466-67,471. Furthermore, the Court noted that every procedural difference could be
outcome-determinative, that it was unlikely that different methods of service would guide a
litigant's choice of forum, and that Erie involved a substantive rule of negligence, not a "house-
keeping" rule that Congress had the constitutional authority to enact. See id. at 468-69,472-73.
Thus, the Court held that arguably procedural rules prescribed by Congress can constitutionally
be applied in diversity cases. Id. at 472,474.
68 Strickland, .supra note 33, at 392.
69 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,15 (1984); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am.,
350 U.S. 198,202-03 (1956).
7° See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203-04.
71 Hirshman, supra note 33, at 1317; Strickland, supra note 33, at 392.
72 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988); Hirshman, supra note 33, at 1317-18.
73 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834,845-46 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing); Strickland, sutra note 33, at 391.
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remedial in nature and intended the Act to complement, not preempt,
state law."
Thus, the issue of whether the FAA mandated the enforcement of
an arbitration agreement contained two components: 75 First, did Con-
gress intend the FAA to apply in state proceedings and was that appli-
cation constitutional? 78 Second, did the Act, as a matter of statutory
construction, cover the arbitration agreement in question?" State and
federal courts have grappled with these issues since Erie.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION Acr
In 1956, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America," the United
States Supreme Court avoided the constitutional issue created by Erie
by holding that the contract in question did not evidence "a transac-
tion involving commerce," which meant that the FAA, by its own terms,
did not apply:79 The case arose from an employment contract which
provided that, in the event of a dispute, the parties would submit the
matter to arbitration under New York law. 8° At the time the parties
entered into the contract, the employee was a resident of New York
and the employer was a New York corporation." The contract, made
in New York, called for the employee to move to Vermont to perform
his duties. 82 The employee was subsequently discharged, and when he
sued the company in Vermont state court, Polygraphic removed the
action to federal district court under diversity jurisdiction." Poly-
graphic then sought a stay of proceedings under section 3 of the FAA
so that arbitration could occur in New York."
The United States District Court for the District of Vermont de-
nied the stay, ruling that Erie required the court to apply Vermont law,
which made arbitration agreements revocable at any time prior to the
actual award.85 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
74 Southland, 465 U.S. at 25, 29, 34-35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
73 Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 838-39.
76 Id.
" Id. at 839.
78
 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
79 Id. at 200-01, 202.
80 Id. at 199.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Bernhardt, 550 U.S. at 199.
94 Id, at 199-200.
85 Id. at 200.
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Circuit reversed, holding that section 3 could be invoked inde-
pendently of section 2 and covered all contracts, even those that do
not involve maritime transactions or transactions in commerce." The
United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, reasoning
that sections 1 through 3 were all part of the same regulatory scheme
and covered the same field—maritime transactions or transactions "in
commerce."87 Thus, as the employment transaction did not "involve
commerce," the Court held that section 3 did not apply and left the
Erie question unresolved."
In 1967, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing, 89
the United States Supreme Court finally addressed the Erie question
by holding that Congress enacted the FAA under its Article I interstate
commerce power." The Court further held that the FAA governed the
agreement in question because the transaction involved commerce.°'
Finally, the Court also held that an arbitration agreement is separable
from the contract in which it is found." Thus, the Court held that a
claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract was an arbi-
trable issue.93
The Prima Paint controversy arose out of a consulting agreement
between Prima Paint, a Maryland corporation, and Flood & Conklin
("F&C"), a New Jersey corporation, that followed the sale of F&C's
paint business to Prima Paint." Shortly after the parties signed the
six–year agreement, F&C filed for bankruptcy. 95 Prima Paint sued for
rescission of the contract on the ground of fraudulent inducement."
F&C moved to stay the court action pending arbitration, as provided
in the agreement. 97 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the stay. 98 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and, later, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the stay."
88 Id. at 200, 201.
87 1d. at 201.
88 Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 201, 202.
B9 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
90 Id. at 404-05.
91 Id. at 401.
Id. at 402, 404.
93 Id. Therefore, only claims for rescission or revocation that are directed specifically at the
agreement to arbitrate will be heard by a court. Id. at 404. All others are decided via arbitration.
Id.
91 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 397.
95 1d. at 398.
96 M. at 398 & n.2.
97 Id. at 399.
98 Id.
99 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 399-400.
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In affirming the decision, the Court first declared the consulting
agreement a contract that evidenced a transaction in commerce.'"" The
Court reasoned that three facts made this a clear case of interstate
commerce. 1 °' First, the agreement involved corporations from two dif-
ferent states. 102 Second, the paint business served wholesale clients in
a number of states.m Finally, the transaction involved the transfer of
the business from New Jersey to Maryland.'"
The Court next held that the arbitrator should decide the claim
of fraudulent inducement while the federal court could only consider
issues specifically related to the agreement to arbitrate. 105 The Court
reasoned that section 3's remedy of a stay should be available in the
same situations as section 4's remedy of compelling arbitration. 1 "6 Sec-
tion 4 instructed federal courts to order arbitration once they were
satisfied that the actual making of, or failure to comply with, the
agreement to arbitrate was not at issue. 1 °7
Finally, the Court summarily held that Congress enacted the FAA
on the basis of its commerce and admiralty powers.i° 8 In a footnote,
the Court supported its conclusion by citing brief legislative statements
suggesting that the bill was intended to cover the fields of maritime
transactions and foreign and interstate commerce.'"" Thus, the Court
eliminated the Erie question and provided an example of a contract
evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce while affirming the
Second Circuit's dismissal of an appeal from the grant of a stay of
proceedings in the District Court.""
The dissent, written by Justice Black and joined by Justices Douglas
and Stewart, disagreed with all three holdings."' justice Black reasoned
that the FAA did not apply to the consulting agreement. both because
the main supporters of the Act were those involved in producing,
buying, selling and transporting commodities across state lines and
because Congress did not use the term "affecting commerce," which
ill° Id. at 401.
101 Id. at 397, 401.
1021d,
1 °3 1d. at 401.
104 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 401.
105 1d. at 403-4/4.
ED6 Id.
1 °7 Id. 9 U.S.C. § 4 states, —The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the
court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration . ..." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988),
108 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404-05.
mid. at 405 n.13.
11111 1d. at 399, 401, 405, 407.
111 Id. at 409-11 (Black, J., dissenting),
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usually indicates Congress's desire for an expansive reach." 2 The dis-
sent further reasoned that the language of section 4 did not mandate
severability, it simply posited the further question of what claims would
put the making of an agreement to arbitrate in issue." 3 Additionally,
Justice Black reasoned that Congress did not intend the Act to be
substantive law enacted under the commerce power because the legis-
lative history contained assurances that the new law was procedural in
nature and granted no new rights other than enforcement remedies." 4
Finally, the dissent cited indications in the legislative history that the
Act did not apply to state proceedings and the Act lacked independent
federal question jurisdiction, both of which were inconsistent with the
idea that Congress was enacting substantive law." 3
In sum, the Prima Paint Court held that Congress enacted the FAA
under its Article I powers, that the FAA governed the consulting agree-
ment because the underlying transaction involved commerce, and that
an arbitration clause is severable from the rest of a contract." 6 There-
fore, a claim of fraudulent inducement of the entire contract needed
to be decided via arbitration."' Despite the dissenting opinion that
disagreed with these holdings," 8 Prima Paint seemed to settle the
question of whether the FAA applied in state courts, as well as in
federal courts by implication." 9 Some state courts, however, narrowly
read Prima Paint as only applying to cases over which federal courts
could have had jurisdiction.'"
In 1984, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the California Supreme Court by holding that section
2 of the FAA preempts state laws that withdraw the power to enforce
arbitration agreements.' 2 ' Thus, the Court established the FAA as the
generally applicable substantive law of arbitration in state and federal
courts. 122
The dispute in Southland arose out of franchise agreements, which
included arbitration clauses, between Southland Corporation, the
112 1d. at 409-10 & n.2 (Black, J., dissenting).
113 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 410 (Black, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 418-19 (Black, J., dissenting).
"5 1d. at 420 (Black, J., dissenting).
116 1d. at 401, 402, 404-05.
117 1d. at 406-07.
113 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 409-11 (Black, J., dissenting).
113 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 422 (Black,
J., dissenting).
120 See, e.g., Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda Cty., 645 P.2d 1192, 1203-04 (Cal. 1982);
Hirshman, supra note 33, 1326-27 & r1.125.
121 465 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1984).
122 Strickland, supra note 33, at 396.
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owner and franchiser of 7-Eleven convenience stores, and its franchi-
sees.'" Several of the franchisees sled suits against Southland alleging
various claims, including violations of the California Franchise Invest-
ment Law.Y 2" Southland's answer to almost all of these suits included
the affirmative defense of failure to arbitrate. 12' Upon consolidation of
the claims into a class action suit, Southland petitioned to compel
arbitration of all claims.'" The California Superior Court compelled
arbitration on all of the claims, except those based on the Franchise
Investment Law, because the statute did not allow any waivers of its
terms.' 27 The California Supreme Court agreed, holding that the claims
under the California statute were not arbitrable and that the Franchise
Investment Act did not contravene the FAA.'"
The Supreme Court reversed,'" reasoning that in enacting section
2 "Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and with-
drew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the reso-
lution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration."'" The Court relied on the legislative history to support its
position, reasoning that it was unlikely that Congress would only ad-
dress the Act's impact in federal courts in light of the widespread
problem.'m According to the Court, this problem encompassed both
common law hostility to arbitration and the lack of state statutes to
override it and order enforcement of arbitration agreements.' 32 More-
over, the Court reasoned, a contrary interpretation of Congress's intent
would lead to forum shopping and have little effect because most civil
litigation occurs in state courts.'" Therefore, the Southland Court con-
cluded that the California Franchise Investment Law, as construed by
the California Supreme Court, violated the Supremacy Clause and was
preempted by the FAA.'"
After Southland cleared away the last of the constitutional con-
cerns involving Congress's authority, only two limitations to the scope
of the FAA and its broad policy favoring arbitration remained.'" The
125 Southland, 465 U.S. at 3-4.
124 1d. at 4.
'25 Id.
126 Id.
at 4,5 n.l.
12g Southland, 465 U.S. at 5.
Id. al 6.
156 1d. at 10.
131 1d. at 12-13.
1 " M. at 14.
1 " Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16.
199
	 at 16-17.
1 "' /(2. at 10-11.
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first, the savings clause in section 2 states that arbitration agreements
are valid except upon "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."'" The Court's ruling in Prima Paint that
these grounds must be aimed at the arbitration agreement specifically
and not at the contract in general, however, lessened its impact.'"
Thus, the debate shifted to focus on the second limitation, also con-
tained in the statute itself.'" This limitation, a threshold requirement
in section 2 mandates that the arbitration agreement be "in a written
maritime contract transaction or a contract 'evidencing a transaction
involving commerce.'"
The issue of whether a contract "involved" commerce became
increasingly important because federal courts have developed their
own arbitration common law that tends to resolve any ambiguities in
favor of arbitration.'" The choice of federal versus state law was based
on whether the FAA, by its own terms, applied to the contract, which
turned on whether it involved commerce."' State and lower federal
courts developed numerous standards for interpreting this require-
ment."' The two most widely used standards were the "affecting" com-
merce and the "contemplation of substantial interstate activity" tests. 14 "
The "affecting" commerce standard broadly construed the "involv-
ing commerce" language in section 2 of the FAA to show Congress's
intent for the reach of the Act to "be coextensive with congressional
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause." 144 Thus, courts adopt-
ing this standard found the FAA applicable to all contracts evidencing
transactions that Congress could constitutionally regulate.'" Under
this standard, almost all contracts fell within the FAA because courts
have interpreted the Commerce Clause in a manner that gives Con-
gress the power to reach even local activities, provided those activities
could possibly affect interstate commerce in the aggregate.'"
156 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)).
137 See 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
158 See, e.g., Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 417 (7th Cir. 1984); Metro Indus. Painting Corp.
v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir. 1961).
"Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-11 (9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)).
14 ° Metro Indus., 287 F.2d at 386 (Lumbard, J., concurring). See also Strickland, supra note
33, at 400-10 for a full discussion of the differences between state and federal arbitration law.
141 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; Strickland, supra note 33, at 410.
142 See, e.g., Snyder, 736 F.2d at 418 ("affecting commerce" test); Metro /ttus., 287 F.2d at 384
(interstate elements test); Ex parte Costa, 486 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Ala. 1986) ("slightest nexus"
test); Downing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 335 N.W.2d 139, 141 (Mich. App. 1983) (location of events
test) .
143 Snyder, 736 E2d at 418; Metro Indus., 287 F.2d. at 387 (Untibard, J., concurring).
144 Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (10th Cir. 1986).
145 See, e.g., id.; Snyder, 736 E2d at 418.
140 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
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The "contemplation of substantial interstate activity" standard, on
the other hand, did not ascribe to the view that Congress intended to
reach all contracts within its constitutional limits when it enacted the
FAA.'41 Chieffudge Lumbard first articulated this view in a concurring
opinion in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co. "8
According to Judge Lumbard, the standard should be whether the
parties thought the transaction involved substantial interstate activity
at the time they agreed to the arbitration clause, not simply whether
the transaction crossed state lines.'" Whether the parties contemplated
substantial interstate activity rested, in turn, on their state of mind,
determined by looking at: contract terms, how the parties thought the
contract would be carried out and how the contract was performed.'"
Lumbard justified his standard by looking at Congress's intent in
passing the FAA.'" He stated, "In enacting the Arbitration Act, unlike
various other statutes invoking the interstate commerce power, Con-
gress was not seeking to regulate and control activity affecting com-
merce, but was providing for those engaged in interstate transactions
an expeditious extra-judicial process for settling disputes."' 52 Noting
that people involved in interstate commerce can avoid the Act by not
including such clauses in their contracts, Lumbard believed the pur-
pose of the FAA was to uphold the expectations of the parties to an
arbitration agreement.'" He argued that a broader standard which
invoked the FAA upon the crossing of state lines would impose on the
parties a dispute resolution system to which they had not agreed.'"
147 See Metro Indus., 287 F.2d at 387 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
148 Id. at 385-88 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
149 Id. at 387 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
150 Id. (Lumbard, J., concurring).
151 Id. (Lumbard, J., concurring).
152 Metro Indus., 287 F.2d at 387 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
159 	(Lumbard, J., concurring).
104 Id. (Lombard, J., concurring). Judge Lumbard's oft-quoted opinion stated:
In enacting the Arbitration Act, unlike various other slat utes invoking the interstate
commerce power, Congress was not seeking to regulate and control activity affecting
commerce, but was providing for those engaged in interstate transactions an expe-
ditious extra-judicial process for settling disputes. The Arbitration Act may be
avoided entirely by those engaged in interstate traffic if they merely refrain from
including any arbitration provisions in their contracts, The Congressional intent
was not, therefore, to impose an adjudicative system on those who wished none nor
was the intent to affect all contracts possessing certain interstate elements; the
purpose of the act was 10 assure to those who desired arbitration and whose
contracts related to interstate commerce that their expectations would not he
undermined by federal judges, or, . . . by state courts or legislatures.
The significant question, therefore, is not whether, in carrying out the terms of
the contract, the parties did cross state lines, but whether, at the time they entered
into it and accepted the arbitration clause, they contemplated substantial interstate
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Therefore, his standard sought to determine whether the parties
thought they were agreeing to state or federal arbitration law when
they entered into the contract.' 55
Under this and other even narrower standards, courts have found
the FAA inapplicable to certain consumer purchases of services and
goods, as well as some real estate transactions—transactions that prob-
ably are included in the FAA's reach under the "affecting" commerce
standard.'" In the absence of the FAA, these courts have applied state
statutory and common law.'" In order to resolve this interpretive split,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to an Alabama
case that turned on which standard was appropriate.'"
IV. ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COMPANIES V. DOBSON
In 1995, in Allied-Bruce Terminix Go. v. Dobson, the United States
Supreme Court held that the proper test to employ when determining
the applicability of the FAA is whether the transaction, in fact, involved
interstate commerce "even if the parties did not contemplate an inter-
state commerce connection."'" Writing for a seven member majority,
Justice Breyer reaffirmed Southland, which had established the FAA's
applicability in state courts, and then went on to rule that the phrase
"involving commerce" is equivalent to the words "affecting commerce"
in terms of signaling Congressional intent to fully exert its commerce
power.'" Moreover, he reasoned, the phrase "evidencing a transaction"
means that the transaction must actually involve interstate cam-
merce.'61 In so holding, the Court reversed the Alabama Supreme
Court, which had held that a transaction between a homeowner and
the local office of a multi-state pest control company did not "involve
commerce," and thus did not implicate the FAA because the parties
did not contemplate substantial interstate activity when they agreed to
the contract and its arbitration provision.I 62 The Supreme Court held
activity. Cogent evidence regarding their state of mind at the time would be the
terms of the contract, . . . evidence as to how the parties expected the contract to
be performed and how it was performed is relevant to whether substantial interstate
activity was contemplated.
Id. (Lumbard, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
1' See id. at 386, 387 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
156 See, e.g., Riess v. Murchison, 329 F.2d 635, 644 (9th Cir. 1964); Ex parte Williams, 555 So.
2d 146, 147, 148 (Ala. 1989); Strickland, supra note 33, at 431, 442-43.
157 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354, 355-56 (Ala. 1993).
156 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 114 S. Ct. 1292 (1994).
159 1 15 S. Ct. 834, 843 (1995).
16° /d. at 839, 841.
161 1d, at 841.
162 1d. at 837, 843.
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that the transaction did, in fact, involve interstate commerce and re-
manded the case.'" The Court concluded that interstate commerce
was involved because Terminix International Co. ("Terminix") and its
franchisee, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies ("Allied-Bruce") oper-
ated in more than one state and used materials from outside of Ala-
bama to perform the contract in question."'"
In 1987, Steven Gwin purchased a lifetime "Termite Protection
Plan" (the "Plan") from the local office of Allied-Bruce.' 66 Under the
Plan covering Gwin's Birmingham, Alabama house, Terminix prom-
ised to protect it against termites, to reinspect periodically, to provide
necessary treatment, and to repair damage caused by new termite
infestations.' 66
 Terminix guaranteed the Plan and the contract pro-
vided exclusively for arbitration to settle any controversies arising out
of 4.' 67
 In 1991, the Gwins had Allied-Bruce reinspect the house prior
to its sale to Mr. and Mrs. Dobson.' 68
 After Allied-Bruce gave the house
a clean bill of health, the Gwins sold the house and the Plan to the
Dobsons.' 69 Shortly after moving in, the Dobsons "found the house
swarming with termites."'"
After Allied-Bruce attempted to treat and repair the problem, the
Dobsons sued the Gwins, Allied-Bruce and Terminix in state court) ."
Allied-Bruce and Terminix immediately asked the court for a stay of
proceedings under section 2 of the FAA.' 72
 The state trial court denied
the stay.'" The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's
decision, holding that the FAA did not preempt an Alabama statute,
which made executory arbitration agreements invalid and unenforce-
able, because the Act did not apply.' 74
 The Supreme Court of Alabama
interpreted the FAA's "involving commerce" requirement narrowly,
using Judge Lumbard's Metro Industrial "contemplation of substantial
interstate activity" test. 175
163 1d. at 843.
164 Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 843.
165 Id. at 837.
166 Id.
1671d.
Er"A Id.
L65 Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 837.
17° Id.
1711d.
172 Id. Allied-Bruce and Tertninix asked for the stay under § 2 of the FAA and not ,§ 3 because
§ 3 expressly allows for stays in cases brought in federal courts. See id. at 849 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) .
1 " Id. at 837.
174 Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 837.
175 See id.
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Before reaching the statutory "involving commerce" issue, the
United States Supreme Court declined to overrule Southland as re-
quested by the Dobsons and twenty state attorneys general.'" Conced-
ing that the issue was not fully briefed when previously argued, the
Court found it inappropriate to reconsider its holding in Southland in
the absence of significant changes in the law or practical problems
spawned by the decision.'" Moreover, the Court reasoned, private
parties had probably relied on Southland when drafting contracts and
Congress had since enacted legislation that further expanded the
scope of arbitration.'"
Next, the Court addressed the statutory construction issue.'" In
holding that "involving commerce" meant "affecting commerce," the
phrase used to signal Congress's intent to exercise fully its commerce
power, the United States Supreme Court looked at the statute's word-
ing, its background and its structure in light of the Act's overriding
purpose of eliminating judicial hostility towards arbitration.'" First, the
Court noted that its interpretation was linguistically possible because
a dictionary showed that the two words "sometimes can mean about
the same thing."'s' The Court then looked at the FAA's legislative
history and dicta in prior Supreme Court decisions that indicated
congressional intent to provide enforcement of arbitration agreements
to the fullest extent of its commerce power. 182 Further, the Court
concluded that a broad reading of the phrase "involving commerce"
served the Act's basic purpose, putting arbitration agreements on an
equal footing with other contract terms.'"
Finally, the Court addressed contrary arguments, the most impor-
tant of which involved its ruling in Bernhardt.'" The Bernhardt Court
had ruled that an employment contract between a New York corpora-
tion and a New York resident who became a Vermont resident in order
to perform the contract did not "involve commerce." 18' The Terminix
Court responded to the argument that these facts would trigger appli-
cation of the FAA under an "affecting commerce" standard by stating
that the language used by the Bernhardt Court to describe the "involve
176 Id. at 838-39.
177 /d, at 839.
' 7g Id.
179 Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 839.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 /d. at 839-40.
183 Id. at 840.
184 Terminix, 115 S. Ci at 840-41.
185 Id.
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ing commerce" requirement was very broad and its opinion did not
"discuss the implications of the 'interstate' facts to which the respon-
dents now point." 186 Thus, according to the Terminix Court, Bernhardt
did not require a narrower interpretation of the word "involving."187
After holding that "involving commerce" meant the same thing as
"affecting commerce," the Court went on to examine the effect of the
clause "evidencing a transaction" in section 2's language, "a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce." 188 The Court framed
the issue as whether it meant the transaction must actually involve
interstate commerce or whether it meant "more." 189
 The "more" in this
question referred to the "contemplation of the parties" interpreta-
tion.'" The majority reasoned that the "contemplation" test would
invite litigation about what the parties contemplated, which would
undercut the FAA's goal of helping people avoid litigation, and make
enforceability dependent on the happenstance of a reference by one
of the parties to interstate commerce in the contract or during nego-
tiations.''" The Court, therefore, concluded that the "commerce in
fact" standard was the better interpretation.' 92
 The Court posited that
section 2 also covered agreements to arbitrate existing claims, which
should be enforced regardless of what the parties thought at the time
they contracted with each other.'" Additionally, the Court reasoned
that the word "evidencing" may have been added simply because of
concerns Congress may have had of exceeding its constitutional
authority, and not because of a desire to limit the Act's scope. 194
The Terminix Court then summarily dealt with the argument that
the FAA should not preempt state law without a clear mandate from
Congress by opining that the argument. had little weight, because
Supreme Court decisions since the enactment of the FAA had already
displaced state law.' 95 Finally, the Terminix Court did not agree that a
"contemplation" test would provide better protection for consumers,
because individuals also want faster, less costly alternatives to litiga-
tion.'" Moreover, the Court reasoned, the Act allows a consumer to
189 See id. at 841.
187 /d.
188 1d.
I " Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 841.
"1 See id.
'" 1 Id. at 841-42.
192 Id.
1u3
194 Terminix, 115 S. Ct.. at 842.
199 Id.
19" Id. at 842-43.
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force a business to arbitrate a small claim not worth pursuing in
court. 197 Therefore, the majority declared the "commerce in fact" in-
terpretation the correct standard for determining whether or not the
FAA applied to a written arbitration agreement.'"
In her separate concurrence, Justice O'Connor expressed agree-
ment with the majority's construction of section 2 of the FAA. 199
 O'Con-
nor disagreed, however, with the majority view that Congress intended
the FAA to apply in state courts.'" Although she believed that the Court
had "abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with
respect to the Federal Arbitration Act" and was concerned about its
preemption of state statutes designed to protect consumers, she felt
compelled to join the majority opinion because of stare decisis. 20 '
In contrast to Justice O'Connor's adherence to Southland due to
stare decisis, Justice Scalia, in a separate dissenting opinion, argued to
overrule Southland. 202 He felt that Southland's extensive preemptive
effect outweighed the principles of stare decisis because he believed
that primary behavior was not affected by Southland and that any
impaired reliance interests could be remedied via rescission for mis-
take of law. 209 Expressing his willingness to overrule Southland in the
future, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority opinion. 294
Justice Thomas, in a dissent joined by Justice Scalia, primarily
attacked the majority's adherence to Southland and did not reach the
statutory construction issue.'" Specifically, Justice Thomas argued that
the FAA does not apply in state courts.'" He also argued that even if
the FAA does apply in state courts, the states may enforce an arbitration
agreement by providing different remedies than those called for by the
FAA. 207
In concluding that the FAA does not apply in state courts, Justice
Thomas cited a thirty-five year gap between enactment of the FAA and
any attempt to apply it in state courts.'" He reasoned that the delay
was caused by the general understanding during that period that
197 See id. at 843.
199 Id.
1999
	 115 S. Ct. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2°° Id. at 843-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2°1 Id. at 843, 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2°2 /d. at 844-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2°8 /d. at 845 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2°4 See Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 845 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
298 /d. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207 1d. at 849 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2°8 1d, at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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arbitration was a form of procedure. 209
 Thus, state courts did not apply
the FAA and federal courts did not apply state arbitration statutes when
they determined the FAA inapplicable. 21 " justice Thomas also charac-
terized arbitration agreements as a type of forum-selection clause,
which are arguably procedural in nature. 2 " He found additional sup-
port in the language of other provisions of the FAA, which explicitly
limited themselves to federal courts, and argued that the lack of federal
question jurisdiction showed Congress's intent to enact a procedural
measure for use in federal courts. 212
 Finally, he argued that any ambi-
guity surrounding the original design of the statute should be inter-
preted in light of federalism concerns, which weigh against the dis-
placement of state law. 215
Even if section 2 of the FAA does preempt state law, Justice
Thomas argued, no textual basis exists for requiring state courts to
enforce arbitration agreements through specific enforcement, as sec-
tions 3 and 4 require federal courts to do. 214
 Reasoning that damages
could satisfy section 2's mandate to enforce arbitration agreements,
Justice Thomas argued that section 2 of the FAA did not itself require
state and federal courts to grant a stay. 215
 If it did, he reasoned, section
3's mandate to federal courts to grant stays would be superfluous. 215
Finally, in accord with Justice Scalia's dissent, Justice Thomas
found the doctrine of stare decisis inadequate to justify affirming
Southland's holding that the FAA applies to state courts. 217
 Further-
more, he found stare decisis inapplicable to the question of whether
state courts must grant stays. 218
 He argued that the grant of a stay was
not actually at issue in Southland because the California statute in
question there declared the agreement void, and underlying state law
would have required a stay had the agreement been enforceable. 219
In sum, the Court reaffirmed Southland's holding that the FAA
applies in state courts and further held that the FAA governs an
arbitration agreement if the underlying transaction affects interstate
commerce, regardless of the level, if any, of interstate commerce the
2111 MrMiniX, 115 S. Ct. at 845-46 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
210 1d. at 846-47 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 847 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 847-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2"S
	 at 848 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
214 li?rrninix, 115 S. Ct. at 849 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
215 Id. (Thomas, J,, dissenting).
2111
	 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 849-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 850 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219
 7erntinix, 115 S. Ct. at 850 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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parties foresaw when drafting the arbitration agreement. 22° Although
disagreeing with the Court's interpretation of legislative intent, Justice
O'Connor concurred on the basis of stare decisis principles. 221 Justice
Scalia dissented because he reasoned that stare decisis should not stop
the Court from overruling Southland. 222 Finally, justice Thomas argued
in dissent that Southland should be overruled and, therefore, did not
address the statutory construction issue. 223
V. ANALYSIS OF TkRMINIX ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER
TRANSACTIONS
Analytically speaking, the Court's opinion in Terminix raises some
difficulties. Both the concurring and dissenting opinions presented
strong arguments, based in large part on the legislative history of the
Act, that the Court had decided Southland incorrectly. 224 As noted by
Justice Black in his Prima Paint dissent, the legislative history is replete
with assurances that the FAA was to be procedural, not substantive
law. 225
 Congress designed the Act in 1925 to complement the burgeon-
ing body of state statutes that made arbitration agreements enforce-
able. 226
The major difference between Justice O'Connor's concurrence
and the dissents by justices Scalia and Thomas was whether stare decisis
dictated that Southland stand.227 Like Justices Scalia and Thomas, this
commentator finds it difficult to believe that Southland's preemption
of state law should be reaffirmed. 228 Moreover, the scope of this pre-
etnption was pushed even further in Terminix via statutory construc-
tion. Justice Thomas also argued that even while following Southland,
Alabama could still withhold a stay of proceedings, compulsion of
arbitration or both as remedies, because the Court had never pre-
viously held that state courts must enforce arbitration agreements
using the measures provided by the FAA for use in federal courts. 229
Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA, which provide for stays and orders
2241 Id. at 843.
221 Id. at 843-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
222 Id. at 845 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
221 Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 845-46 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing).
225 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 418-19 (1967) (Black.",
dissenting).
226 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 26-27 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 845 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
id, at 849-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
226 See id. at 845 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 849-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 850 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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compelling arbitration, explicitly refer to their use in federal courts
alone.230
Moreover, the Court's attempt to distinguish Bernhardt with a "do
as we say, not as we do" argument is not terribly convincing."' While
the language in Bernhardt was broad, the actual holding pointed to a
narrower standard. Bernhardt involved a contract between a New York
resident and a New York corporation that called for the employee to
relocate to Vermont to work for the company there. 292
 Under the
"commerce in fact" standard adopted by the Terminix Court, this trans-
action would clearly involve commerce. The Bernhardt Court, however,
held that the transaction did not involve commerce. The actual hold-
ing should signify more than the dicta that accompanied it.
Finally, as both Justices O'Connor and Thomas point out, while
Congress may regulate areas traditionally within the sphere of the
states' powers under the Commerce Clause, the Court has generally
refused to give federal statutes wide ranging preemptive effect in the
absence of a clear congressional mandate to that effect. 2" The legisla-
tive history of the FAA does not contain such a mandate."' As noted
above, the legislative history indicates a desire to supplement, not
preempt, state laws. 235
 The precepts of federalism should not be lightly
abandoned. Regardless of these infirmities, however, the majority's
holding in Terminix that the FAA applies whenever a transaction, in
fact, involves commerce, is now the law. 2" This creates several practical
implications for consumers and commercial entities alike.
VI. IMPACT OF ThRMINIX ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER
TRANSACTIONS
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson will have a profound
impact on both commercial organizations and individuals. Under the
Supreme Court's "commerce in fact" test, virtually every written arbi-
tration agreement is subject both to the FAA and to the burgeoning
pro-arbitration common law that federal courts have developed under
the Act.231
 Moreover, the Court's treatment of arbitration agreements
as on an equal footing with other contract terms is a death knell for
23° 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988).
23I See Prminix, 115 S. Ct. at 840-41.
232 13ernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198,199 (1956).
233 Terminix, 115 S. Gt. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 848-49 (Thotnas, J., dissent-
ing).
234 See id. at 848-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting),
235
 See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
236 Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 843.
237 See id. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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state statutes designed to protect consumers or to ensure knowledge-
able and voluntary consent. 235 The FAA, which does not provide similar
protections, now preempts these statutes.
The "commerce in fact" test will subject almost every commercial
contract containing an arbitration agreement to the FAA and eliminate
most prearbitration litigation. 239 While the test does seem to require a
fact-based inquiry, parties apparently can satisfy the test by showing the
presence of any interstate element—an interstate firm, diversity of
citizenship, or even the use of any supplies or materials that come from
a different state.24° One recent decision has gone so far as to indicate
that use of the United States Postal Service satisfies this "commerce in
fact" test.24 ' Businesses should evaluate and negotiate commercial con-
tracts on the assumption that the FAA and the federal common law
generated under it will apply unless the arbitration clause explicitly
chooses state law or is clearly linked to a choice of law provision. 242
Additionally, the FAA will govern existing commercial contracts regard-
less of the parties' understanding at the time of contract if one party
simply incorporates sonic element of interstate commerce into its
performance. 243 Thus, the "commerce in fact" test will provide protec-
tion for the companies who have relied on Southland and allow those
who prefer the FAA's terms to invoke it with unilateral action. Busi-
nesses must battle over the meaning of an arbitration agreement at the
time of contracting; otherwise, federal common law will provide it.
More importantly, whether the transaction's connection to inter-
state commerce is clear or fairly indirect, Tenninix indicates that courts
will enforce boilerplate arbitration provisions against consumers. The
FAA provides no special protections for consumers, and any doubts as
to its application are resolved in favor of arbitration. The FAA now
preempts state laws that have attempted to ensure notice of what is
essentially a waiver of the constitutional right to a jury trial. Moreover,
while the Court has not ruled directly on the question of contracts of
adhesion, the Court did rule in Prima Paint, that arbitrators must
decide claims such as fraudulent inducement unless they are spe-
cifically aimed at the arbitration clause itself. 244 This makes it difficult
238 See id. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
239 See id. at 840.
249 See Strickland, supra note 33, at 458.
241 See Mr. Mudd, Inc. v. Petra Tech, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Mo. App. 1995),
242 See Volt Info. Servs. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S 468,
479 (1989).
243 See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 388 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Lumbar& J., concurring); see also Strickland, supra note 33, at 457-58.
244 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
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to challenge the fairness of the contract, especially since arbitrators are
not as familiar as courts with complex areas of the law. 245
Although the Court correctly noted that consumers can also force
businesses to submit to arbitration when their claims are too small to
justify the time and expense of litigation, it seems unlikely that a
company would find it financially preferable to litigate in such situ-
ations. 246 Under the Court's holding, the FAA displaces state statutes
designed to protect consumers, or at least ensure they are aware that
they are agreeing to arbitration.247 Companies who market their prod-
ucts and services to consumers will find it much easier to obtain and
enforce predispute arbitration agreements.
While this ease may reduce costs and, possibly, prices to consum-
ers, the disadvantages of arbitration may well outweigh these advan-
tages as the disadvantages increase. Arbitration is known for its limited
discovery and less formal proceedings. 245 Without full discovery, how-
ever, actions such as personal injury or product liability claims will be
very difficult to establish. Although many states' laws exempt these
kinds of claims from arbitradon,249 these statutes are now preempted
by the FAA, which does not differentiate based on the underlying
transaction.
Furthermore, arbitrators who tend to "split the difference" are
likely to make awards that favor businesses because their relationship
to and reputation among the businesses is much more likely to spawn
demand for their services. Unlike judges, arbitrators are paid directly
by the parties involved for their services in resolving disputes. 25° En-
hanced reputation translates into increased referrals and proportion-
ately higher income. Arbitrators are not likely to see individual con-
sumers as sources of repeat business or reference. Unequal bargaining
power at the inception of a contract may well be followed by nonneu-
tral disposition of disputes arising under it.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson has expanded the reach of
the FAA to cover virtually all written agreements to arbitrate."' Despite
249 ./d. at 415-16 (Black, J., dissenting).
246 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834,842-43 (1995).
247 Id. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
248 Shell, supra note 16, at 632; Stipanowich, supra note 17, at 438.
249 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-c (McKinney 1988).
250 Shell, supra note 16, at 630-31.
251 See Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 841,843.
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an ambiguous legislative history, the Court reaffirmed its holding in
Southland that made the FAA applicable in state courts and further
held that the FAA, by its own terms, covers all written arbitration
agreements provided that the underlying transaction in fact involved
commerce. 252 While this ruling serves the Act's basic purpose of over-
coming common law hostility to arbitration by preempting state law,
the Court's interpretation has given the FAA a significance and impact
that Congress never envisioned or intended. 253 After Terminix, virtually
all agreements to arbitrate between commercial entities will be en-
forced under the FAA and interpreted in a pro-arbitration manner
under federal common law. Finally, companies will find it easier to
obtain such agreements from consumers and enforce them if disputes
arise. While only mentioning state interests, Justice O'Connor's assess-
ment of the situation applies equally to consumer interests: "It remains
now for Congress to correct this interpretation if it wishes to preserve
state autonomy in state courts." 254
JANET M. GROSSNICKLE
252 Id. at 838-39, 843.
255
	 id. at 843; id. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
254 Id. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
